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Abstract—A lot of research has been focused on secure
outsourcing of biometric identification in the context of cloud
computing. In such schemes, both the encrypted biometric
database and the identification process are outsourced to the
cloud. The ultimate goal is to protect the security and privacy of
the biometric database and the query templates. Security analysis
shows that previous schemes suffer from the enrolment attack
and unnecessarily expose more information than needed. In this
paper, we propose a new secure outsourcing scheme aims at
enhancing the security from these two aspects. First, besides all
the attacks discussed in previous schemes, our proposed scheme
is also secure against the enrolment attack. Second, we model the
identification process as a fixed radius similarity query problem
instead of the kNN search problem. Such a modelling is able to
reduce the exposed information thus enhancing the privacy of the
biometric database. Our comprehensive security and complexity
analysis show that our scheme is able to enhance the security
and privacy of the biometric database and query templates while
maintaining the same computational savings from outsourcing.
Index Terms—Cloud computing, secure outsourcing, biometric
identification, security and privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Remote Storage and computation outsourcing are two in-
teger services provided by cloud computing. Data owners
such as individuals or organizational administrators are able to
outsource to the cloud their private data for storage as well as
some computational intensive tasks for computation. Various
works [8]–[10] have been devoted to securing the outsource
process, i.e., ensuring the security of the private data while
still enjoying the convenience provided by cloud computing.
Among various applications, outsourced biometric identifi-
cation is of special interest. This is because, on one hand,
the biometric database itself is of huge size thus making
cloud storage an appealing solution. On the other hand, the
identification process is computationally expensive due to the
large database size. As a result, several schemes have been
proposed to outsource biometric identification to the cloud.
The ultimate goal of these schemes is to protect the security
and privacy of the biometric templates in the database as well
as the query templates under different attacks.
Securing outsourcing of biometric identification has at-
tracted much research effort. In [1], the authors proposed
two different schemes where both single-server model and
multiple-servers model are considered. However, the scheme
for the single-server model still has prohibitive computational
overhead for large databases thus making it less practical. In
the multiple-servers model, it is required that the severs would
not collude, otherwise the security of the biometric templates
is compromised. Following works [2], [3] considered two non-
colluding servers thus suffering from the same drawbacks.
In [7], a privacy-preserving biometric identification scheme
was proposed for the single-server model. However, such
a scheme is not secure under an active attack where the
cloud is able to collude with query users. Most recently, the
authors in [6] proposed a secure outsourcing scheme that
can defend against three different attacks as defined in [6],
which include the attack where cloud and users are allowed to
collude. The basic idea is to model the identification process
as a Nearest Neighbor (NN)search problem. That is, given
an encrypted query template, the nearest neighbor in the
database is identified and returned to the data owner, who can
later decide whether these two templates belong to the same
individual.
Although the scheme in [6] is efficient and can defend
against relatively severe attacks as to date, recent analysis [4]
shows that it still suffers the enrollment attack. That is, if the
cloud is allowed to inject selected templates into the database,
then the cloud is able to recover the query templates based on
the intermediate computation results. Also, we point out that
modelling the identification process as kNN search problem
has inherent limitations in terms of template privacy. To be
more specific, in [6], given two encrypted templates x and y
and an encrypted query template z, the cloud can determine
which template (x or y) is closer to z. Repeating this process,
the cloud is able to identify the closet template to z. As a
result, the relative distance information among the templates
in the database is inevitably exposed.
To deal with the above two security issues, we propose a
new secure outsourcing schemes for biometric identification.
Especially, our proposed scheme can defend against all the at-
tacks defined in [6] as well as the enrollment attack. Moreover,
we model the identification process as a fixed-radius similarity
query problem rather than kNN search problem. That is, our
scheme only enables the cloud to identify the templates within
a fixed radius of the query template. No more information
about the distance is revealed. In this way, less information is
exposed compared to the scheme in [6], thus enhancing the
privacy of the biometric database.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce
the system model and threat model in Section II. Then the
secure outsourcing scheme is proposed in Section III. The
security and complexity analysis is given in Section IV. In
Section V, we present some numeric results showing the
efficiency of our proposed scheme. At last, we conclude in
Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System model
We consider a system consisting of three parties: a data
owner, a set of end-users and a cloud service provider. The
data owner has a biometric database composed of a collection
of users’ biometric templates, where each template can be
represented by an n-dimensional vector T = (t1, t2, · · · , tn).
Each template is registered by an end-user during an enrolment
stage. During a preparation stage, the data owner will pre-
process the templates and outsource them to the cloud. Later,
in an identification stage, an end-user will submit her identi-
fication request composed of a query template Tj to the data
owner. The data owner will generate a token for each specific
query template Tj and submit the token to the cloud. Then,
the cloud is responsible for identifying the template Ti in the
database such that dist(Ti,Tj) < θ, where dist() is a distance
measurement function and θ is a pre-defined threshold. In
words, the cloud will identify and return the template(s) whose
distance from the query template is within a threshold.
B. Threat model
In this paper, we consider a semi-malicious cloud model
where the cloud will follow the protocols but is allowed to
collude with some malicious end-users. To be specific, the
collusion happens when some malicious end-users will submit
query templates to the data owner and choose to share the
templates with the cloud. As a result, the cloud is able to
learn pairs of template and its encrypted form.
In summary, depending on the different capabilities of the
adversaries, we propose two attack models as follows.
1) Passive Attack: the cloud is able to know the encrypted
templates Enc(Ti), for i = 1, 2, · · · ,m, where Enc(Ti)
is the encrypted form of Ti. Also, the cloud is able
to observe a series of w encrypted queries Enc(Tj),
j = 1, 2, . . . , w. However, the service provider does not
know the underlying templates Tj in plaintext.
2) Active Attack: besides the encrypted templates Enc(Ti),
the cloud is able to observe a series of w encrypted
queries Enc(Tj) as well as the corresponding plaintext
Tj , j = 1, 2, . . . , w. As mentioned earlier, such an
attack can happen when the cloud collude with malicious
end-users.
Besides the above two attacks, we also allow the enrollment
attack as considered in [4].
3) Enrollment Attack: the cloud is able to inject templates
in the enrollment stage. That is, the cloud is able to have
a series of v encrypted templates Enc(Ti) as well as the
corresponding plaintext Ti, i = 1, 2, . . . , v.
Informally, the security requirement of the outsourced bio-
metric identification against the above three attacks is that the
cloud is not able to learn more information about the templates
than what is allowed through the identification process. That is,
the cloud is only able to decide whether the distance between
two templates is within a threshold or not. It is not feasible
for the service provider to derive any key information about
the enrolled templates and the query templates.
III. SECURE OUTSOURCING OF BIOMETRIC
IDENTIFICATION
A. Basic Framework
Intuitively, our proposed secure outsourcing scheme is
consist of four phases. In the first phase, the data owner
will generate the system parameters and a transformation
key. Then, for each biometric template in the database, it is
transformed to an encrypted form using the transformation key.
The transformed database is then outsourced to the cloud. In
the query phase, for every submitted query template, the data
owner will generate a token using the same transformation
key. At last, in the identification phase, the cloud will identify
the template whose distance from the query template is within
a pre-defined threshold.
Our proposed scheme is composed of the following five
algorithms.
• SetUp()→ param: the set up algorithm generate system
parameters param.
• KeyGen() → sk: the key generation algorithm will
generate transformation key sk.
• Transform(sk,x) → Cx: given a vector x and transfor-
mation key sk, the transformation algorithm will trans-
form x into a disguised form Cx.
• TokenGen(sk,y) → Ty: given a vector y and trans-
formation key sk, the token generation algorithm will
generate a token Ty for y.
• Evaluate(Cx, Ty) → Λ = {0, 1}: given the transformed
vector Cx and token Ty, the evaluation algorithm will
output a result Λ satisfying
Λ =
{
1, dist(x,y) ≤ θ
0, otherwise,
where dist(x,y) is the distance between x and y and θ
is a pre-defined threshold.
B. Secure Transformation and Evaluation
The essential part in our proposed scheme is the secure
transformation and evaluation process. In a high level view,
the enrolled templates are transformed through the Transform
function and the TokenGen function will generate a token
by transforming the query template. It is critical that given
the transformed templates, it it computationally infeasible to
recover the original vector. However, the Evaluate function
is able to reveal some information of two templates. That is,
whether the distance between the two templates is within a
threshold or not.
Our transformation process is similar to the techniques
utilized in [6]. However, the computational models as well as
the security requirements are fundamentally different. We now
give some intuition about our transformation and evaluation
process. The detailed construction is presented in Protocol 1.
Given a vector x, we first extend it to x′ by inserting the
threshold θ and some random numbers. Then x′ is transformed
to a matrix from and is disguised by multiplying it with
random matrix. Denote this disguised form as Cx. Given a
query vector y, the TokenGen function will transform y into
a disguised form Cy . The Evaluate function takes in Cx and
Cy as input and outputs αβ(x ◦ y − θ), where α and β are
one-time random positive numbers associated with y and x,
respectively. By comparing αβ(x ◦ y − θ) with 0, the cloud
is able to determine whether the inner product of x and y is
within the threshold θ or not. We note that since α and β are
one-time random numbers and are different for each template,
the exact value of (x ◦ y − θ) can be concealed from the
final result. We note that the inner product x ◦y is flexible to
express different distance metrics between x and y.
C. The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we give the detailed implementation of our
secure outsourcing scheme in Protocol 1. In the protocol, the
result I in function Evaluate is equal to (distE(x,y) − θ),
where distE(x,y) is the Euclidean distance between x and
y. We use the Euclidean distance as an example to measure
the similarity between two templates. However, it is easy to
design the vectors x and y such that the Evaluate function
will give other distances such as the Hamming distance. The
correctness of our proposed scheme is shown in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: The proposed outsourcing scheme in Protocol 1
is correct. That is, I = αβ(distE(x,y)−θ), where distE(x,y)
is the Euclidean distance between x and y.
Proof: For a square matrix Y , the trace Tr(Y ) is defined
as the sum of the diagonal entries of Y . Given an invertible
matrix M1 of the same size, the transformation M1YM
−1
1 is
called similarity transformation of Y . From linear algebra, we
know the trace of a square matrix remains unchanged under
similarity transformation. That is, Tr(Y ) = Tr(M1YM
−1
1 ).
Then we have
I = Tr(T1) + Tr(T2) = Tr(SpPY Sy) + Tr(SqQY Sy).
Since Sy , Sp and Sq are selected as lower triangular matrices,
where all the diagonal entries are set to 1, the diagonal entries
of SpP , SqQ and Y Sy are all the same as those of P , Q and
Y . Thus we have
I = Tr(PY ) + Tr(QY ).
Since P ,Q and Y are diagonal matrices, we have Tr(PY ) =
p ◦ y′ and Tr(QY ) = q ◦ y′. Thus
I = p ◦ y′ + q ◦ y′ = x′ ◦ y′ = αβ(distE(x,y) − θ).
IV. SECURITY AND COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
A. Security against Active Attack
We focus on the security of our proposed scheme under
active attack since it implies the security under passive attack.
We also utilize TokenGen function as the representative since
Protocol 1 Secure Outsourcing of Biometric Identification
Input: x = {x1, . . . , xn},y = {y1, . . . , yn}, θ.
Output: Λ = {0, 1}.
Setup()→ param:
1: Data owner sets param = {n, θ}., where n is the
dimension of templates and θ is a pre-defined threshold.
KeyGen(λ)→ sk:
1: Randomly generates two matrices M1 and M2 with di-
mension (n+5)× (n+5) and a permutation pi : Rn+5 →
R
n+5.
2: Set sk = {M1,M2,M
−1
1 ,M
−1
2 , pi}
Transform(sk,x)→ Cx:
1: Generate random numbers β and rx.
2: (Extend) Extend x to an (n+5)-dimensional vector x′ =
(2βx1, 2βx2, . . . , 2βxn,−β
n∑
i=1
x2i , β, βθ
2, rx, 0).
3: (Permute) Permute x′ to obtain x′′ = pi(x′).
4: Transform x′′ a diagonal matrices X with x′′ being the
diagonal.
5: Generate a random (n + 5) × (n + 5) lower triangular
matrix Sx with the diagonal entries fixed as 1. Compute
Cx = M1SxXM2.
TokenGen(sk,y)→ Ty:
1: On receiving a query template y, data owner generates
random numbers ry and α.
2: (Extend) Extend y to an (n+5)-dimensional vector y′ =
(2αy1, 2αy2, . . . , 2αyn, α,−α
n∑
i=1
y2i , α, 0, ry).
3: (Permute) Permute y′ to obtain y′′ = pi(y′).
4: Transform y′′ to a diagonal matrix Y with diagonal being
y′′.
5: Generate a random (n + 5) × (n + 5) lower triangular
matrix Sy with the diagonal entries fixed as 1. Compute
Cy = M
−1
2 Y SyM
−1
1
6: Send the token Cy to the cloud.
Evaluate(Cx, Cy)→ Λ:
1: For every transformed template Cx in the database, the
cloud computes I = Tr(CxCy), where Tr(·) is the trace
of a matrix.
2: Cloud sets Λ = 1 if I ≤ 0, which means that the template
x is identified; otherwise set Λ = 0.
the transformation process in Transform is similar. The basic
idea is to show that an adversary cannot differentiate two
transformed templates obtained from the TokenGen function.
Thus, the adversary cannot learn key information from the
disguised form of templates. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The proposed outsourcing scheme is secure
against active attack, that is the cloud cannot derive key
information from transformed templates.
Proof: Consider the transformation of vector y, where
y = (y1, . . . , yn). The vector y is first extended to y
′ =
(2αy1, 2αy2, . . . , 2αyn, α,−α
n∑
i=1
y2i , α, r). The vector y
′ is
then extended to a diagonal matrix Y . Then, it is transformed
to Cy = M
−1
2 Y SyM
−1
1 , where Sy is a random lower
triangular matrix. We note that the product of Y and Sy will
produce a lower triangular matrix denoted as Gy . Now we
focus on the product Cy = M
−1
2 GyM
−1
1 .
Denote the entries in M−12 and M
−1
1 as aij and bij ,
respectively, where i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n + 5. For matrix Gy ,
denote its non-zero entries in the lower triangular part as sij ,
where i > j and i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n+5. Then, by law of matrix
multiplication, each entry cij in Cy can be written in the form
of
cij =
∑
f1ij(aij , bij)mi + f
2
ij(aij , bij)α
+f3ij(aij , bij)r + f
4
ij(aij , bij , sij), (1)
where f tij , t = 1, 2, 3, 4 are polynomials. Equation (1) is ob-
tained by summing up each terms ofmi, α and r, respectively.
In the transformation process, aij and bij are fixed. α,r
and sij are one-time random numbers. mi are chosen and can
be controlled by the adversary. However, since α,r and sij
are one-time random numbers, the polynomials f2ij(aij , bij)α,
f3ij(aij , bij)r and f
4
ij(aij , bij , sij) all looks random to the ad-
versary. As a result, the summation cij is random. This means
that, for any two templates chosen by the adversary and one
transformed template, the adversary cannot distinguish which
template is actually transformed. As a result, the adversary
cannot derive key information from transformed templates.
The other important aspect of security is to what extent
the Evaluate function can reveal information of the templates.
It is clear that Evaluate will the distance information which
is necessary for identification. However, we note that every
vector y is associated with a one-time independent random
number α and every vector x is associated with a one-
time random number β. As a result, in the active attack,
what an adversary can observe through Evaluate function
is a series of results Ii = αβi(distE(x,y) − θ). Since βi
are selected independently, the final results Ii only reveals
whether αβi(distE(x,y)− θ) is positive or not. No more key
information can be derive from Ii.
B. Security against Enrolment Attack
As mentioned earlier, an enrolment attack was proposed in
[4] making the secure outsourcing scheme in [6] vulnerable.
In an enrolment attack, an adversary (i.e., the cloud) is able
to inject known templates into the database. During evalua-
tion, the cloud is able to derive the following equation (i.e.,
Equation (3) in [4]):
bci =
(Tr(Y
′
i B
′
c)− Tr(X
′
iB
′
c))− (yi(n+1) − xi(n+1))
yii − xii
,
where bci is the i-th entry in a submitted query template bc.
Since Tr(Y
′
i B
′
c) and Tr(X
′
iB
′
c) are computable and x and y
are selected by the cloud, the cloud is able to recover bci.
Repeating such attack will finally recover the whole query
template bc as demonstrated in [4].
We now show that our proposed scheme is secure under
the above enrolment attack. The underlying reason that the
scheme in [6] cannot defend such attack is that the evaluate
function will cancel all the randomness (i.e., the random lower-
triangular matrix) introduced in the encryption process. In
comparison, the evaluation function in our scheme will give
αzβx(dist
2(x, z)− θ), where αz and βx are one-time random
numbers associated with the templates z and x respectively.
As a result, Equation (3) in [4] is modified to
bci =
(Tr(PB
′
c)− Tr(QB
′
c))− (pn+1 − qn+1)
αcβx(pn − qn)
.
Note that αc is a one-time random number associated with
a query bc and βx is a one-time random number associated
with x. Thus, although the adversary is able to insert known
templates into the database, it cannot derive bci due to the one-
time randomness. In other words, our proposed outsourcing
scheme is able to defend against the enrolment attack.
C. The Effect of Randomness on Security
It is important to understand the effect of different random-
ness on security. We briefly categorize the one-time random-
ness utilized by our scheme into three types.
• Type I: result-disguising randomness. In the Extend step
in both Transform and TokenGen, we use random β and
α respectively to multiple with each entry of x and y.
Since α and β will remain in the decryption result, we
name it as result-disguising randomness.
• Type II: vector-extension randomness. In TokenGen, we
extend the vector y and pad it with a random r.
• Type III: matrix-multiplication randomness. In both
Transform and TokenGen, we multiple the extended
matrices (P , Q and Y ) with random matrices (Sp, Sq
and Sy).
The Evaluate function will calculate the trace of the matrix
(e.g., CpCy). We note that the function Tr(·) will cancel Type
II and Type III randomness. However, Type I randomness will
remain in the evaluation result. This is important since it will
only reveal partial information of the plaintext, which is just
sufficient for the purpose of biometric authentication. Also,
the underlying reason that the scheme in [6] is vulnerable to
enrollment attack is that it lacks Type I randomness.
D. Complexity Analysis
We focus on the complexity analysis of TokenGen and
Evaluate since they are executed repeatedly in the identifi-
cation process while SetUp, KeyGen and Transform are one-
time processes. As shown in Protocol 1, it is obvious that the
computational bottleneck of TokenGen and Evaluate lies in
matrix multiplication. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the matrices involved in the computation all have the same
dimension n× n.
The function TokenGen will take 3 matrix multiplications.
Since matrix multiplication generally has a complexity of
O(n3) without optimization, the complexity of TokenGen is
also O(n3). In the function Evaluate, the trace of two matrices
CpCy and CqCy need to be computed. We note that there is
no need to calculate the matrix multiplication first. What needs
to be computed are the main diagonals of the two matrices.
Thus, Evaluate has a complexity of O(n2).
In terms of communication overhead, we assume that each
entry in the matrix or vector has the same size l. For each
template in the database, the data owner needs to outsource
the encrypted template Cx = {Cp, Cq} to the cloud. Thus the
communication overhead is 2n2l. Similarly, the communica-
tion overhead for each query template is n2l.
V. NUMERIC RESULTS
The most important parameter that affects the performance
of the identification process is the length of the vectors denoted
as n. It will determine the execution time for both Transform
and Evaluate, which are executed frequently in the querying
process. Another parameter is the size of the database N .
However, since our identification algorithm is basically a linear
scan of the database, it can be predicted that the time for
identification is also linear to N . Thus, it is of more interest
to measure the performance of Transform and Evaluate in
terms of the dimension n.
Fig. 1. Template transformation and evaluation time for each template
The simulation is conducted in a personal computer with
1.6 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU, 4 GB RAM and macOS Version
10.12.6. The algorithm is implemented using the Armadillo
C++ linear algebra library. In the simulation, we let the
length of the vector vary from 100 to 2000, which is able
to cover the length of some typical biometric templates such
as FingerCodes [5]. The execution time of Transform and
Evaluate for each template is presented in Fig.1. We can
see that both TokenGen and Evaluate are quite efficient. For
example, it takes around 1 second to generate a token for
a template with length 2000, which is quite long in real
applications. The numeric results also correspond with the
complexity analysis that Transform has O(n3) complexity
while Evaluate has O(n2) complexity.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new secure outsourcing scheme
for biometric identification aiming at enhancing the security
and privacy for the outsourced biometric database and the
query templates. Specifically, our scheme is able to defend
against the enrollment attack that makes previous schemes
vulnerable. By modelling identification as fixed radius sim-
ilarity search problem, our scheme exposes less information
than previous schemes that based on kNN search problem. In
summary, our comprehensive security and complexity analysis
show that our scheme is able to enhance the security and
privacy of the biometric database and query templates while
maintaining the same computational savings from outsourc-
ing.
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